Drugs, Drugs Everywhere but Just Not for the Poor by Ragavan, Srividhya
Texas A&M University School of Law 
Texas A&M Law Scholarship 
Faculty Scholarship 
1-2016 
Drugs, Drugs Everywhere but Just Not for the Poor 
Srividhya Ragavan 
Texas A&M University School of Law, ragavan.sri@law.tamu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Srividhya Ragavan, Drugs, Drugs Everywhere but Just Not for the Poor, 8 WIPO J. 41 (2016). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/807 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more 
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu. 
Drugs, Drugs Everywhere but Just Not for the
Poor
Srividhya Ragavan
Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law
Access to medicines; Compulsory licensing; Developing countries; TRIPS; United States; WIPO
Introduction
In 2009, Ramesh, a highly-paid executive in India, was diagnosed with a rare form of cancer. His hope
lay in the compound soranafib tosylate marketed as Nexavar, and the patent in the drug was owned by
the German pharmaceutical company, Bayer AG. In India, Nexavar was cleared for marketing in 2007,
followed by the grant of a patent in 2008.1 Although Ramesh’s net worth placed him in the top 20 per cent
of the annual average income by quintile in India, he was devastated to learn that the treatment regimen
for Nexavar cost approximately US $5,000 (INR 2,80,428) per month.2 The egregious price of Nexavar
was nearly five times higher than the median annual income in India.3 In India, individuals earning US
$5,000 per yearwould consider themselves fairly well-employed.4Thus, Bayer’s Nexavar had the distinction
of creating have-not out of the haves!
At the time Ramesh was considering his treatment options, India housed approximately 20,000 patients
with liver cancer and about 9,000 patients with kidney cancer. So, when Natco, an Indian generic drug
company, petitioned the controller general of patents to compel Bayer to issue a licence in its favour, the
evidence overwhelmingly favoured Natco. The generic Nexavar from Natco was priced at approximately
US $200 (INR 10,000) per month. The controller’s order concluding that Bayer’s action warranted a
compulsory licence was affirmed on appeal by Sridevan J at the Intellectual Property Appellate Board.5
The highpoint of the above incident was the United States’ visceral reaction following the issuance of
the compulsory licence in India. OnAugust 2, 2013, the pharmaceutical industry’s lobbying effort translated
into a request from the chairman of the US Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on
Ways and Means to the US International Trade Commission to institute an investigation on India’s trade
practices,6 using powers under Tariff Act of 1930 s.1332(g).7 The Special 301 Report of the Office of the
United States Trade Representative (USTR), on which India is usually featured, specifically identified
the Bayer decision as “concerning” both in the 2012 and 2013 reports.8
India was no lone ranger. In fact, the United States established a similar pattern of response in Colombia
following the issuance of Resolution 2475 of 2016 on June 17, 2016 by the Minister of Health, Alejandro
1“India Grants First Compulsory License to Generic Drug Producer”, available at http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/india-grants-first
-compulsory-license-to-generic-drug-producer [Accessed October 31, 2016].
2 Insurance coverage in India broadly covers about 5–20 per cent of the population. Generally, government sponsored schemes have a cap of INR
30,000 (approximately US $500) and is limited to hospitalisation. In addition, domiciliary treatment (medication) is not covered as part of most insurance
in India. Email from Professor Surupa Gupta, University of Mary Washington, February 12, 2014.
3Mike Palmedo, “Graphics on U.S. Pharmaceutical Exports to India, Patents, the Compulsory License, and Prices”, available at http://infojustice
.org/archives/32249 [Accessed October 31, 2016].
4 Srividhya Ragavan, “Patients Win over Patents”, The Hindu, March 7, 2013.
5Bayer v NatcoM.P. Nos 74–76 of 2012 and M.P. No.108 of 2012.
6 International Trade Commission Investigation, Notice for Investigation No.332-543, August 29, 2013 (on issues relating to trade, investment, and
industrial policies in India, with particular reference to its effects on the US economy and US jobs).
7 19 USC s.1332(g).
8 79 Fed. Reg. 421 (January 3, 2014); see also Office of the United States Trade Representative, Special 301 Report (2012, 2013).
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Gaviria.9 Resolution 2475 was a declaration by the Government to issue a compulsory licence to lower
the price of imatinib, a leukaemia drug, marketed as Glivec. The patent in Glivec was owned by the Swiss
pharmaceutical company, Novartis AG.10 Resolution 2475 was a response to a petition submitted by the
Colombian non-governmental organisations to compulsorily license Glivec with a view to reduce the cost
of the medication.11 At that time, Novartis priced 400mg of Glivec at COP 129,000 (approximately US
$43).12 The total annual cost of 400mg of Glivec in Colombia, amounting to US $15,000 per patient per
year, represented nearly twice the average annual income of Colombians.
Meanwhile, on August 24, 2016, Colombia celebrated a historic moment when the Colombian
Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a guerrilla group, ended an armed
conflict that began in 1964.13 The United States pledged US $450million in support of the peace plan—Paz
Colombia—to provide for programmes to retrain members of FARC and to eradicate the drug trade that
has ravaged Colombia.14
The US response to Colombia followed a predictable pattern when the USTR, citing Resolution 2475,
indicated that Paz Colombia may be at risk!15 The outrageousness of the USTR’s response can be best
understood considering that it caused the House Democrats to express serious concern over the USTR’s
actions in a letter addressed to Ambassador Michael Froman, the US Trade Representative.16 The letter
pointed out that the United States would derogate from its obligations as a signatory to the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994 (TRIPS) of the World Trade Organization
(WTO). TRIPS and the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 2001 (Doha
Declaration)17 expressly authorise the use of such licences for exactly the same situations for which it was
used by Colombia.18 Interestingly, when the USTR cited India for the Bayer decision in the Special 301
Report, it carefully suggested that India’s actions will be weighed in the light of the Doha Declaration.19
The simple objective for this article is to understand the legitimacy and limitations of US involvement
in another country’s sovereign actions taken expressly in the public interest, or to protect public health,
9Andrew Goldman, “Colombia Issues Public Interest Declaration to Lower Price of Glivec”, available at http://keionline.org/node/2601 [Accessed
October 31, 2016]; Ministry of Health and Social Protection Resolution Number 2475 of June 14, 2016, available at https://www.minsalud.gov.co
/Normatividad_Nuevo/Resoluci%C3%B3n%202475%20de%202016.pdf [Accessed October 31, 2016].
10Novartis was involved in a huge dispute in India to patent imatinib mesylate, whose patent would have given the drug new life once the patent
on imatinib expires. Novartis AG v Natco Pharma Application No.1602/MAS/1998 (2005) (India), available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1352538
/ [Accessed October 31, 2016]; Indian Patent Application No.1602/MAS/1998.
11Ministro de Salud y Protección Social, “Solicitud de una declaración de interés público en el acceso al medicamento imatinib bajo condiciones
de competencia”, available at https://www.minsalud.gov.co/sites/rid/Lists/BibliotecaDigital/RIDE/VS/MET/Solicitud-de-una-declaracion-en-el-acceso
-al-medicamento-IMATINIB.pdf [Accessed October 31, 2016].
12Knowledge Ecology International, “Background FAQ on Glivec (imatinib) Compulsory License in Colombia”, available at http://keionline.org
/colombia-imatinib-FAQ [Accessed October 31, 2016].
13WOLA, “Excerpts from the August 24 Announcement of a Final Peace Accord between the Colombian Government and the FARC: The Joint
Communiqué”, available at http://colombiapeace.org/2016/08/25/excerpts-from-the-august-24-announcement-of-a-final-peace-accord-between-the
-colombian-government-and-the-farc/ [AccessedOctober 31, 2016]. The conflict with FARC ended after more than 50 years. Unfortunately, Paz-Columbia
was never implemented because the deal was rejected in a referendum. See Sibylla Brodzinsky, “Colombia referendum: voters reject peace deal with
Farc guerrillas,” The Guardian, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/02/colombia-referendum-rejects-peace-deal-with-farc
[Accessed October 31, 2016].
14Stephanie Burgos, “Does Colombia Really Have to Choose between Poverty and Public Health”, available at http://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica
.org/2016/05/does-colombia-really-have-to-choose-between-peace-and-public-health/ [Accessed October 31, 2016].
15Andrew Goldman, “15 House Dems Press USTR to Clarify Position on Compulsory Licensing of Cancer Drug Patent in Colombia”, available at
http://keionline.org/node/2577 [Accessed October 31, 2016].
16The letter was led byWays andMeans Committee RankingMember Sander Levin (D-Michigan). Letter to AmbassadorMichael Froman, available
at https://democrats-waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/documents/Colombia%20Compulsory%20License
%20Letter.pdf [Accessed October 31, 2016]; Zach Carter, “Colombia Fears U.S. May Reject Peace Plan to Protect Pharma Profits”, http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/entry/colombia-gleevec_us_5733d4ece4b077d4d6f224ee [Accessed October 31, 2016]; Carolyn Y. Johnson and Karen DeYoung,
“Dispute with Swiss DrugMaker Has Colombian OfficialsWorried about U.S. Peace Funding”, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/business
/economy/dispute-with-swiss-drugmaker-has-colombian-officials-worried-about-us-peace-funding/2016/05/18/6f1903ee-1c5e-11e6-8c7b-6931e66333e7
_story.html [Accessed October 31, 2016].
17Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 2001, November 20, 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2.
18Goldman, “15 House Dems Press USTR to Clarify Position on Compulsory Licensing of Cancer Drug Patent in Colombia” available at http:/
/keionline.org/node/2577 [Accessed October 31, 2016]; Ed Silverman, “House Democrats Blast US Trade Rep for Pressuring Colombia over Novartis”,
available at https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/05/25/novartis-gleevec-patents-cancer/ [Accessed October 31, 2016].
19Sean Flynn, BrookK. Baker and Srividhya Ragavan, “Trade, Investment, and Industrial Policies in India: Effects on the U.S. Economy”, International
Trade Commission, 2013, on file with author.
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such as the compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals. The first section takes the example of compulsory
licensing as a legitimate sovereign action and delineates its scope in the light of the international trade
obligations under TRIPS. The second section discusses the rights and obligations of the USTR vis-à-vis
the United States’ sovereign trading partners and how international trade obligations intersect with the
rights of the USTR. The third section outlines the legality of the USTR’s actions in light of the United
States’ international obligations. The fourth section discusses the question of whether—and if so, how—the
other international organisations, particularly the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), can
be involved in restoring the legitimacy of sovereign actions taken in the public interest. The article’s
conclusion outlines the importance of co-ordination amongst international organisations as a critical
element to achieve the objectives of the trade and developmental agenda.
International trade obligations and legitimate sovereign actions
Pharmaceuticals and life-savingmedications hold a unique significance in themarketplace. Unlike consumer
products, where demand is dependent on affordability, the demand for life-saving medications is
independent of affordability. Thus, in markets with low per capita income, such as developing countries,
high prices sustain or even increase the demand as access becomes limited. As the number infected with
a disease increases, productivity of the economy can be adversely affected. Under these circumstances,
ensuring access to life-saving medicines becomes an important sovereign responsibility. Discharging
judiciously such a responsibility in a manner that would protect public health, preserve economic
productivity and maintain socio-economic balance forms a part of the legitimate expectations from any
government. The following details how international agreements and national laws are structured to enable
a sovereign to discharge the function of protecting public health.
Pharmaceuticals and sovereign actions
Compulsory licensing is an example of a unique tool legitimately deployable by a sovereign government.
The term “compulsory licensing” refers to the mandatory licensing of a patented technology used for
specific reasons under limited circumstances. Such licences are specifically used to reduce the price of a
patented product by forcing the patent holder to license the technology to third parties, thus creating
competition. Compulsory licences are unique because they serve to balance the patent owner’s right with
the societal need for the product. They operate where public interest concerns outweigh the patent holder’s
rights.20 Such licences are legitimate, especially in the context of inventions involving pharmaceuticals,
food and national security concerns. In the case of pharmaceuticals, the use of compulsory licences
represents a legitimate sovereign action for two reasons: first, because the rights to life and health are
constitutional guarantees in countries such as Brazil and Colombia, they prompt governmental action to
ensure access to medication;21 secondly, compulsory licences represent the negotiated exclusion to patent
rights under international trade agreements, as discussed below.
Article 30 of TRIPS provides for compulsory licences as an outlined exclusion to patent rights. The
provision allows countries to determine the grounds for issuing compulsory licences. Furthermore, the
Doha Declaration explicitly clarified the determination in art.30 of TRIPS thatWTOmembers may provide
20Srividhya Ragavan, “The Jekyll and Hyde Story of International Trade: The Supreme Court in Phrma v. Walsh and the TRIPS Agreement” (2004)
38 Rich. L. Rev. 777, 784; Rafael V. Baca, “Compulsory Patent Licensing in Mexico in the 1990’s: The Aftermath of NAFTA and the 1991 Industrial
Property Law” (1994) 35 IDEA 183, 184–185; David J. Henry, “Multi-National Practice in Determining Provisions in Compulsory Patent Licenses”
(1977) 11 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ. 325.
21Brazilian Constitution art.196 establishes the right to health. Brazil also established the National Unified Health Care System (Sistema Único de
Saúde) to guarantee universal health care coverage to all Brazilian citizens. Law 8.080/90 (Brazil). See also Law 8.142/90; Law 1751/2015 (Colombia)
(regulating the fundamental right to health).
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limited exceptions to the rights conferred by a patent. This declaration represents WTO members’
commitment to enable access to medication. It affirms that TRIPS can and should be interpreted
“in a manner supportive ofWTOmembers’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote
access to medicines for all”.22
In so doing, the Doha Declaration emphasises that TRIPS should be a part of the developing country
members’ efforts to address the public health problems. It adds that, although intellectual property rights
are essential for medical innovation, the prices of medication should not impede access in developing
nations. Thus, the Doha Declaration establishes the sovereign right and legitimacy of WTO members to
protect public health by compulsorily licensing patents and the freedom to determine the grounds of
compulsory licensing.
Importantly, the TRIPS compulsory licensing provisions represent a balance that forms the crux of the
principles and objectives enshrined in arts 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement. In essence, art.7 outlines that
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to technological advancements
in a manner conducive to “social and economic” welfare of member states and to the mutual advantage
and benefit of producers and users. Article 8 discusses the principles under which the objectives of art.7
will be satisfied. Thus, the “principles” under art.8 recognises members’ rights to adopt public interest or
public health measures in sectors vital to social, economic and technological development of the WTO
member. The narrative in arts 7 and 8 bears wide social and political consequences for developing nations
and allows member nations to tailor measures facilitating global trade while also achieving national goals.23
For instance, poorer nations may be able to use compulsory licences in vital technologies such as life-saving
medications to promote downstream innovations otherwise blocked often by rigid definition of intellectual
property rights. Such use can also be consistent with TRIPS, especially if the reduced price results in
increased volume sales. For example, when Nexavar was subject to a compulsory licence in India, causing
a reduction of price, Bayer benefited from increased volume sales of the drug from the lowered price.24
The increased volume sales offset revenue losses that Bayer feared would ensue from the licence.25
Compulsory licence provisions in local laws
Several countries have translated the general prescription in TRIPS into statutory provisions in national
laws with a view to be in conformity with international obligations. For instance, s.84 of the Indian patent
statute allows the Government to compulsorily license a patent three years after the grant.26 Applicants
seeking compulsory licences should attempt to negotiate a licence with the patent owner (as required under
TRIPS) for a minimum period of six months. The grounds for third parties to a compulsory licence are:
• the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention have not
been satisfied;
• the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price; or
• the patented invention is not worked within the territory of India.
The grounds are fully in accordance with art.5(A) of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property 1883. Further, in India, a compulsory licence can be granted under s.92 if there is a national
emergency, such as a public health crisis or where the Government intends to use the patent for
non-commercial public use.
22Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 2001 para.4.
23 Srividhya Ragavan, Patents and Trade Disparities in Developing Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.366.
24Bayer Corp v Union of IndiaM.P. Nos.74–76 of 2012 and No.108 of 2012; OA/35/2012/PT/MUM (Intellectual Property Appellate Board, India).
25Sean Flynn, Brook K. Baker and Srividhya Ragavan, “Justifying India’s Patent Position to the United States International Trade Commission and
the Office of the United States Trade Representative” (2014–2015) 7 Indian J. Intell. Prop. L. 1, 5.
26 Patents Act of 1970 (as amended by Act 15 of April 4, 2005) s.84.
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In Colombia, Law 1751 of 2015 provides that right to health is a fundamental human right.27 Access to
health care is characterised as a mandatory essential public service. The right to health is read to include
the right to access to medication, diagnosis, treatment and rehabilitation of every Colombian.28Considering
this, art.1 directs the Government to establish mechanisms to facilitate health care for Colombians. Further,
the right to health was firmly recognised in Decision T/760 of 2008, rendered by the Constitutional Court
of Colombia.29 The decision was a response to a special tutela action under which citizens may request a
court to determine whether a fundamental right has been violated. Thus, the tutela actions represent a
special writ to protect fundamental rights of citizens and are automatically subject to discretionary review
by the Constitutional Court of Colombia. In T/760, the Constitutional court consolidated 22 petitions to
determine whether the individual cases showed systemic regulatory failures resulting in a violation of a
fundamental right. The court’s judgment established the right to health as a fundamental right and directed
competent authorities to adopt necessary measures to fulfil an outlined mandate to meet health care needs.30
In this regard, the right of the government to compulsorily license patents in the public interest to protect
public health falls within Decree 4302 of 2008.31 A patent can be subject to a compulsory licence by the
national office on the grounds that the patent has never been worked in the country or has not been worked
for at least a year without legitimate reasons. The existence of the public interest, emergency or national
security considerations may also be a good cause for issuing a compulsory licence. Under art.7, if a public
interest exigency is established, a Technical Committee should recommend whether a compulsory licence
can be granted under art.4. Once the recommendation is made by the Technical Committee, the
Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio is legally obligated to process the licence.32 The procedure for
requesting a compulsory licence is outlined in Ch.24 of Decree 1074 of 2015.33Under this decree, a request
for a compulsory licence should be sent to the National Commission forMedications andMedical Devices
to determine if a licence is mandated. The compulsory licensing provisions in Colombian law are subject
to Ch.VII of Decision 486 of the Commission of the Andean Community.34
The most recent grant of compulsory licensing involved a European patent for an anti-viral compound
possessing integrase inhibitor activity, raltegravir.35 Such compounds are effective as anti-HIV agents to
prevent or reduce side effects from reverse transcriptase inhibitors used to treat AIDS.36 In Germany,
Merck marketed raltegravir as Isentress. The patent owner, a Japanese pharmaceutical company, Shionogi
& Co Ltd, sought a preliminary injunction preventing Merck from marketing the drug. When an offer to
Shionogi to provide a worldwide licence on the patent was rejected, Merck requested a compulsory licence
under s.24 of the German Patent Act. The German Federal Court granted Merck’s request considering the
health consequences to which HIV patients already using Isentress would be subjected.37 Under s.24 of
the German patent statute, a non-exclusive authorisation to commercially use an invention shall be granted
on a case-by-case basis by the Federal Patent Court based on public interest considerations established
under s.65. The statute does not define the term “public interest” and thus preserves the sovereign discretion
27Law 1751/2015 (Colombia).
28Law 1751/2015 art.2 (Colombia).
29Decision T760 of 2008, July 2008, available at https://www.escr- net.org/sites/default/files/English_summary_T-760.pdf [Accessed October 31,
2016].
30Decision T760 of 2008, p.4.
31Decreto 4302 of 2008, November 13, 2008 (Colombia), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=190459 [Accessed October
31, 2016].
32Decreto 4302/2008 of November 13, 2008 art.2.2.2.24.7 (Colombia); Goldman, “Colombia Issues Public Interest Declaration to Lower Price of
Glivec”, available at http://keionline.org/node/2601 [Accessed October 31, 2016].
33Ministerio de Comercio, Decreto 1074, Por medio del cual se expide el Decreto Único Reglamentario del Sector Comercio (May 26, 2015).
34Andean Community, Decision 486 Establishing the Common Industrial Property Regime, Ch.VII, art.62; James Love and Andrew S. Goldman,
“Colombia Asked to Declare Excessive Price for Cancer Drug Contrary to Public Interest”, available at http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/12/03/colombia
-asked-to-declare-excessive-price-for-cancer-drug-contrary-to-public-interest-grounds-for-compulsory-license/ [Accessed October 31, 2016].
35European Patent No.1,422,218 (DE: (DE 602 42 459.3).
36 “German Federal Patent Court Issues Compulsory License on Patents for HIV Drug Raltegravir”, Email from Priti Radhakrishnan via IP-health
Listserv, September 8, 2016.
37This decision is subject to appeal.
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to determine whether and when such a licence may be granted. Just like in India and Colombia, a
compulsory licencemay be granted under German law to ensure an adequate supply of the patented product
for the German market, even if by only importation.
Statutory provisions that preserve the Government’s right to interfere with the private property in patents
are not alien to the United States. For instance, the objective of the Bayh-Dole Act is for the government
to retain sufficient rights over federally funded inventions to protect the public against non-use or
unreasonable use of inventions.38 Health or safety needs are legitimate grounds under the statute for the
federal agency funding the research to exercise the march-in right to compel a licence. The federal
government also retains a non-exclusive, non-transferable, royalty-free licence to use the invention.
Similarly, under the Judicial Procedure Act, the US Government retains the right to make, use or
manufacture a patented product or process “without license” provided the patent holder is duly
compensated.39 The Energy Storage Competitiveness Act is yet another example where the secretary is
vested with the discretion to compel the patent owner to negotiate “nonexclusive licenses, and royalties
on terms that are reasonable, as determined by the Secretary” in the field of energy storage.40 Further, the
secretary may require that the development of a new invention funded under the enactment be subject to
terms deemed necessary by the secretary to “advance the capability of the United States to successfully
compete in global energy storage markets”.41 Another example is the Clean Air Act under which a
compulsory licensing may be granted upon an application made by the administrator and based on a
determination that a patent is not “reasonably available” and thereby hinders the implementation of the
objectives of the title.42
Unilateral actions and multilateral dispute settlement obligations
The discussion above details how every country uses the support from the international trade regime to
statutorily sanction sovereign action to deal with exceptional public interest situations. However, it does
not clarify the credence of the US position with reference to the discussion on India and Colombia when
these countries exercised the sanctioned rights to compulsorily licensemedication. The following discussion
deals with statutes that authorise the USTR’s intrusion into other countries’ policies.
Section 182 and the USTR
The United States’ intrusion into sovereign policies and legitimate actions in the public interest, such as
the granting of compulsory licences in other countries, is authorised under s.182 of the Trade Act of 1974
(Trade Act), commonly referred to as the Special 301 provision.43 This provision authorises the USTR to
identify countries that are perceived to deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual property
rights or deny fair and equitable market access to US industries or entities that rely on intellectual property
protection to compile the Special 301 Report. The USTR forms a part of the executive office of the
president and is the agency tasked with negotiating trade agreements and conducting unilateral reviews
of policies of other sovereign countries as part of the responsibilities to enforce US trade policy, including
intellectual property policy. Thus, the USTR identifies the “act, policy, or practice” of foreign countries
that, in its opinion, burdens or restricts US commerce by denying adequate intellectual property protection.
Similarly, the USTR identifies a country as denying market access when access to that foreign national
market is affected or denied for US industries. The term “market access” is construed broadly to cover
38 35 USC s.200.
39 28 USC s.1498.
40 42 USC s.17231(h).
41 42 USC s.17231(h)(7).
42 42 USC s.7608.
43 19 USC s.2242.
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any subject matter and without giving any accord or deference to the circumstances that caused the policy.
For instance, when India’s NationalManufacturing Policy discussed promoting green technologies as part
of its environmental protection programme, it was identified as an area of concern by the USTR in its
2013 Special 301 Report because of its potential to affect US investments into India (and because of the
possibility of the compulsory licence prevailing in protected technologies)!44
Once identified, the USTR designates the countries within specific groups before the Special 301 Report
is submitted to the House and the Senate.45 The most egregious identified violators are featured as Priority
Foreign Countries, serious offenders are featured in the Priority Watch List, and the less serious offenders
are included in the Watch List. A priority designation for a country by the USTR results in the greatest
scrutiny of the sovereign nation followed by an investigation and threat of either unilateral sanctions,46
the denial of benefit under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), or both.47 Over the years, the
USTR has clearly increased the number of countries that are put on the Priority Watch List.
Multilateral dispute settlement
Amidst the above, the establishment of the WTO and the US commitment to the multilateral dispute
settlement process remains a significant event. The significance is derived from the fact that the WTO
provides a forum—the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)—to adjudicate and enforce trade related grievances
of individual members. The enforcementmechanism borrows its basic features from the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT).48 The establishment of the DSB necessitates member states to strictly
observe and implement trade obligations, part of which is the dispute settlement process. Thus, all disputes
between member states involving compliance with any of the WTO agreements, including TRIPS, are
subject to the integrated dispute settlement process of the WTO.
Article 23 of the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
1994 (DSU) specifically outlines the redress mechanism for members with respect to any violation,
nullification or impediment of benefits preventing the attainment of trade agreement objectives. Article
23(2)(a) outlines that the DSU procedures remain the unitary mechanism that can be used for findings
that lead to the “suspension of concessions or other obligations” under GATT. Numerous WTO disputes
have reiterated the preference for settlement of disputes using multilateral forum as opposed to sovereign
nations unilaterally taking action against other trading partners. For example, in “Canada—Aircraft Credits
and Guarantees”, the panel observed that “Members shall resolve all disputes through the multilateral
dispute system, to the exclusion of unilateral self-help”.49 Similarly, in “United States—Import Measure
on Certain EC Products”, the panel noted that the general obligation in art.23(1) required members to seek
redress of any violation only within the WTO institutional framework and pursuant to the rules and
procedures of the DSU.50 Further, art.23(2) prohibits unilateral redress preventing members from making
determinations on violations, nullification or impairment of benefits, except through recourse to the DSB.51
In short, the DSU’s emphasis on the multilateral dispute settlement process is meant to prevent unilateral
resolution of disputes by countries with more trade muscles to flex. The strength of the DSU is the DSB’s
juridical nature wherein a panel is constituted to hear both parties if consultations fail.52 The process also
44Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2013 Special 301 Report (2013).
45 19 USC s.2411.
46 19 USC s.2411(d)(3)(VB)(ii).
47 19 USC s.2462(c). The GSP programme provides preferential tariff, including duty-free entry, to goods from developing and least developed
countries with the objective of promoting economic growth.
48Adrian Otten and Hannu Wager, “Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging World View”, 29 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 391, 411–413 (1996).
49 “Canada—Aircraft Credits and Guarantees”, Report of the Panel, January 28, 2002, WT/DS222/R, para.7.170.
50“United States—ImportMeasure on Certain EC Products”, Report of the Panel, January 10, 2001,WT/DS165/R, para VI.20 (opining that art.23(1)
of DSU prohibits “unilateral redress” and the prohibition is more directly provided for under art.23(2)).
51 “United States—Import Measure on Certain EC Products”, Report of the Appellate Body, December 11, 2000, WT/DS165/AB/R, para.111.
52Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 1994 arts 6, 7, 12.
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provides for an appeal by either party, in which case the DSB will not adopt the panel report.53 Appeals
from the panel’s opinions are heard by an appellate body whose findings, once adopted by the DSB, are
final.54 Importantly, the DSB is authorised to take action against non-complying parties.55
The structure of the DSB’s process enables countries, including the United States, to commit to
multilateral dispute settlement. Considering that imposing unilateral threats would violate the US obligations
to the WTO, the Trade Act states that the USTR is not required to take action in any case in which the
DSB has adopted a report or in a ruling that US rights under a trade agreement have not been violated or
denied, nor have the benefits due to the United States under a trade agreement been nullified.56 This and
perhaps the DSB’s ruling on the US Special 301 process, discussed below, explains why the USTR has
hesitated to designate a trading partner with Priority Foreign Country status, a status, which, if proven in
an investigation, would lead to unilateral sanction by the United States.
Scrutiny of the US Special 301 process
When the US Congress failed to repeal s.301 in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, which was
the WTO implementation legislation, the European Union requested consultation as required under the
DSU with the United States.57 When initial consultations failed, a panel was established.58 The European
Union claimed that
“by imposing specific, strict time limits within which unilateral determinations must be made and
trade sanctions must be taken, Sections 306 and 305 of the Trade Act of 1974”
violated the US commitment to the WTO to resolve multilateral disputes through the DSB’s process.59
Thus, the legality of the Special 301 process came under scrutiny by the DSB in “United States—Sections
301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974” to determine whether it violated the US obligations under art.23(1)
and 23(2) of the DSU. The panel opined that the statutory language of s.304 constituted a serious threat
to multilateral dispute resolution. Nevertheless, a “Statement of Administrative Action” (SAA) from the
US administrative authorities, the Panel held, alleviated the concerns.60 The SAA was treated as an
“authoritative expression” by the United States on the subject of reconciling its domestic laws with the
country’s international trade obligations.61 The SAAwas effectively a pledge by the United States promising
that the USTR will:
• invoke DSU dispute settlement procedures, as required under current law; or
• base any s.301 determination of violation or denial of US rights under a relevant WTO
agreement on a panel or Appellate Body findings adopted by the DSB.62
Considering the SAA, the panel held that the Special 301–310 provisions did not violate the United States’
international trade obligations so long as the country does not repudiate or remove its SAA undertakings.
53Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 1994 art.16. The DSB may also unanimously reject the proposed
resolution.
54Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 1994 art.17.
55Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 1994 art.22.
56 19 USC s.2411(2)(A).
57Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 1994 art.6; “United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act
of 1974”, European Communities’ Request for the Establishment of a Panel Pursuant to Article 6 of the DSU, December 22, 1999, WT/DS152/11.
58 “United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974”, Report of the Panel, December 22, 1999, WT/DS152/R, para.4.8. The European
Communities asserted that its own WTO implementation mechanism conformed in letter and spirit with art.23 of the DSU. Trade Barriers Regulation,
Council Regulation 3286/94 laying down Community procedures in the field of the common commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the
Community’s rights under international trade rules, in particular those established under the auspices of the World Trade Organization [1994] OJ
L349/71.
59 “United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974”, Report of the Panel, December 22, 1999, WT/DS152/R, para.1.3, 1.4.
60H.R. Doc. No.103-316, p.1029.
61H.R. Doc. No.103-316, p.364.
62H.R. Doc. No.103-316, pp.365–366.
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However, the panel noted that even a mere threat of trade sanction could be perceived as a threat to the
WTO. The panel report notes that the threat alone can enable a member to exert undue leverage. It can
“disrupt the very stability and equilibrium which multilateral dispute resolution was meant to foster
and consequently establish, namely equal protection of both large and small, powerful and less
powerful Members through the consistent application of a set of rules and procedures”.63
Does the United States exert undue unilateral pressure?
The validity of US actions relating to other countries exercising sovereign rights is the focus of the
discussion below. This discussion is important considering that poorer nations find the Special 301 process
a yearly intrusion by the United States into sovereign actions. Some of these nations may even consider
taking the United States to the DSB to determine whether the USTR’s actions amount to a threat violating
the spirit of art.23 of the DSU and the SAA, in light of the prescriptions and limitations outlined in art.23
as well as the limitations imposed by “United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974”.
The USTR’s actions can be construed as amounting to unilateral threats over sovereign nations for the
following reasons:
Historic pattern
The United States, historically and to date, has regularly exerted pressure on its trading partners. For
example, Chile and Thailand have featured on the PriorityWatch List since 2007; China, Russia, Venezuela
and Argentina have featured on the Priority Watch List since 2006; Bolivia, Belarus, Peru, Romania, the
Philippines, Costa Rica, Colombia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Vietnam have all been regularly featured
on the Watch List.64 Another great example, India, has featured in every Special 301 process since its first
inception in 1989, even after it has fully complied with TRIPS. Such yearly badgering of trading partners
amount to a clear, unequivocal and unilateral threat to adjudicate issues outside the multilateral forum
such as through the DSB.
Unfair pressure
The USTR regularly designates trading partners as having inadequate intellectual property protection
“notwithstanding the fact that the foreign country may be in compliance” with specific trade and intellectual
property obligations.65 For example, despite full compliance with TRIPS after 2005, India in 2013 alone
was designated as a notorious market, was threatened that its status would be elevated to a Priority Foreign
Country which entailed a loss of trade benefits, was subjected to an out-of-cycle review and was taunted
in two successive Special 301 reports (in 2012 and 2013) for granting a compulsory licence to Bayer’s
egregiously priced Nexavar. Thus, the USTR unfairly determines practices that are in compliance with
trade obligations as “an unjustifiable burden amounting to inadequate [intellectual property] protection
and unduly restrictive of US commerce”. It is unfair because the pressure from the USTR’s imposition
causes trading partners to reconsider a nationally favourable policy to instead institute a policy that is
friendly to US domestic economic interests.
63 “United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974”, Report of the Panel, December 22, 1999, WT/DS152/R, para.7.89.
64 “Special 301 Report”, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_301_Report [Accessed October 31, 2016].
65 19 USC s.2411(d)(3)(VB)(ii).
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The United States unilaterally threatens to punish trading partners
The Trade Act retains the right of the USTR to enforce retaliatory punitive trade-related measures. Notably
under the Act, the USTR, based on the identification in the Special 301 Report, is authorised to “suspend,
withdraw, or prevent the application of benefits of trade agreement concessions” as well as “impose duties
or other import restrictions on the goods” for such time as the USTR determines appropriate.66 For instance,
in 2013, the Special 301 Report cited the Bayer decision in India to suggest that the United States would
withdraw GSP benefits and impose sanctions on India.67 In reality, no country can alter GSP or other
benefits that accrue to a trading partner unless the trading partner falls within an applicable exception.
Altering the GSP benefits for any one country would affect theWTO’s most favoured nation clause which
requires that tariff treatments provided to one member be extended to all, subject to limited exceptions.68
Further, the WTO Appellate Body in “European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of Tariff
Preferences to Developing Countries” stressed that GSP criteria must be tailored to the needs of developing
countries to strike down an EU programme that, like Special 301, was justified by domestic economic
interests rather than the “non-reciprocal” development interests of other countries.69
USTR uses public law to further private interests
The USTR’s scrutiny is an undue threat because it is based on domestic and self-claimed interests of
private organisations. In fact, the USTR’s Special 301 Report is largely dependent on representations from
private companies. Susan Sell highlights that most countries included on the Priority Watch List and
Watch List between 1996 and 2000 were requested by the Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers of
America or the International Intellectual Property Alliance.70 In fact, the Special 301 process has been
criticised by Peter Drahos as “a public law devoted to the service of private corporate interests”.71 It is an
example of an US administrative body wielding questionable legal powers to unduly influence sovereign
governments to protect private interests. American trade lobbyists regularly “boast” about how they “fixed”
other countries’ intellectual property laws.72 Such methods reek of the use of undue threat by a country
that regularly flexes its muscles while preaching against it in public.
Lack of deference
The unilateral, univocal Special 301 determinations of the USTR have never historically been given any
deference to public policy, public health or similar human rights, based on constitutional limitations or
other compelling conditions. For example, in 2013, Ukraine’s status was elevated to Priority Foreign
Country for intellectual property law violations, and the status was sustained in 2014 despite the fact that
the country suffered the consequences of Russian invasion several times!73 In 2015, the USTR downgraded
Ukraine to the Priority Watch List with the following note:
66 19 USC s.2171.
67 19 USC s.2242.
68General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 art.1; “Differential andMore Favorable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing
Countries”, Decision of 28 November 1979, WTO Doc. L/4903.
69 “European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries”, Report of the Appellate Body, April 7,
2004, WT/DS246/AB/R, para.163.
70 Susan K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003),
pp.126–129.
71 Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy? (London: Earthscan, 2002), p.89.
72Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism (2002), p.87 (detailing a lobbyist noting, “Jamaica had no intellectual property law, but they
wrote one (with our help). Similarly the Dominican Republic. I sat down with their lawyer and together we wrote their copyright law.”).
73But the USTR determined that no action will be taken considering the political unrest in Ukraine. Office of the United States Trade Representative,
2014 Special 301 Report (2014), p.30.
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“[T]he United States appreciates that the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Cybercrime Division and
Economic Crimes Division have both been willing to work closely with the U.S. Department of
Justice on online piracy and that Ukrainian enforcement personnel have participated in training and
engagement on this issue, including a workshop on Combating Digital Piracy by the Commercial
Law Development Program of the United States Department of Commerce.”74
Thus, the United States uses the Special 301 process and the USTR to impose its version of intellectual
property policies in complete disregard of the targeted country’s local political and economic realities.
Traditionally, the WTO and the DSB have failed to position themselves to appreciate local realities that
genuinely impede intellectual property implementation requiring legitimate sovereign intrusions. For
example, in stark contrast to the deference that the SAA received, the DSB—both the WTO panel and the
Appellate Body—in “India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products”
refused to accept India’s rationale that administrative orders are treated as a legally tenable tool to implement
certain aspects of the statute in question.75 This dispute is a great example of how the DSB has tended to
easily ignore domestic systems and refuse to consider domestic rationales in determining perceived
derogations from international obligations.76Deference to domestic lawmakers’ wisdom has been difficult
to generate at the WTO, particularly the DSB, when the wisdom is from a developing country.
Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 increases scrutiny
That the USTR will be relentless in exerting pressure is clear from the terms of the Trade Facilitation and
Trade Enforcement Act of 2015. Under the Act, the position of “Chief Innovation and Intellectual Property
Negotiator” has been created within the USTR specifically to increase the level of scrutiny over other
countries and to
“take appropriate actions to address acts, policies, and practices of foreign governments that have a
significant adverse impact on the value of United States innovation”.77
The statute creates a Trade Enforcement Trust to fund enforcement actions against foreign countries.
In reality, the deference that the DSB panel extended to the SAA undertakings is exceptional. The
DSB’s reliance on the SAA of a powerful member has been detrimental to less powerful nations. It has
left an impression of a system that has merely worked to reinforce the balance of power inequities. In any
event, the DSU has been consistently criticised for lacking important paradigms required to appreciate
the complexities involved in establishing an intellectual property regime.78 TheDSU’s inability to appreciate
local realities and over-reliance on the TRIPS negotiations during which the balance of powers were even
more skewed than what exists currently, are all internal barriers that have impeded theWTO from achieving
the spirit of the overall objectives. They have also created the dire need for other international organisations
such as WIPO, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations to provide the required
humane angle to balance the trade agenda.
74Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2015 Special 301 Report (2015), p.56.
75 “India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products”, Report of the Panel, September 5, 1997, WT/DS50/6;
“India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products”, Report of the Appellate Body, December 19, 1997,WT/DS50/AB/R.
76Ragavan, Patents and Trade Disparities in Developing Countries (2012), p.366.
77 19 USC s.4301.
78Thomas Cottier, “The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights” in P.F.J. Macrory, A.E. Appleton and M.G. Plummer
(eds), The World Trade Organization: Legal and Political Analysis (New York: Springer, 2005) Vol.1, p.1063.
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WIPO’s Role
WIPO is closely linked to TRIPS in the trade regime. The incorporation of the WIPO treaties into TRIPS
has created a link between the WTO and WIPO with a common objective. The following discussion
expounds the link between the two organisations to determine whether there is scope for larger involvement.
The DSB has periodically consulted WIPO and sought inputs. For instance, in “China—Measures
Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights”,79 WIPO responded to the
Panel’s request and submitted factual information from the official records of the various diplomatic
conferences regarding the interpretation of arts 5(1), 5(2) and 17 of the Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and ArtisticWorks 1886.80Yet, the involvement has been limited to seeking factual information.
Further, the DSB has traditionally provided limited deference to WIPO even in instances where it has
sought input.81 In “United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998”, for instance, the
Appellate Body mentions the response of the Director-General of WIPO to a request for information by
the DSU Panel.82 But, the report notes that “the Panel did not discuss this … [and] the Panel seems to have
taken [a different] view”.83 WIPO also has limited powers to intervene in the DSB’s process when inputs
are not sought except by filing an amicus brief. Unfortunately, most amicus briefs, while accepted, are
not taken into account.84 The need is for a platform for institutional involvement of international
organisations.
WIPO’s adoption of the Development Agenda in 2007 sets the right forum and provides an opportunity
to assume leadership in these matters. The evolution of WIPO as a negotiator for the developing nations
with the WTO will contribute to the restoration of the rather relatively weaker image of WIPO in the
post-WTO era. The Committee on Development and Intellectual Property which was established by the
WIPO General Assembly in 2008 has the objective of implementing the Development Agenda
recommendations.85 These recommendations set the right tenor for WIPO to work on issues relating to
development in the intellectual property context.86 For example, Recommendation 40 requests WIPO “to
intensify its cooperation on intellectual property-related issues with United Nations agencies”, including
theWHO and other relevant international organisations, especially theWTO. Similarly, Recommendation
45 outlines that intellectual property enforcement should be contextualised within “broader societal interests
and especially development-oriented concerns” outlined in art.7 of TRIPS. Unfortunately, there is no
specific mention on issues relating to intellectual property and access to life-saving medications, but the
recommendations are commendable for outlining larger public interest concerns and for implicating the
work of the United Nations, the WTO and the WHO. In turn, the WHO’s specific objective on the trade
and health diplomacy agenda includes a commitment to support countries on implications of international
trade and trade agreements on health. The WHO also hopes to build the capacity of countries to negotiate
the support of collective action to address global health challenges, with whichWIPO should be involved.
The newly released report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines also
79“China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights”, Report of the Panel, January 26, 2009,WT/DS362/R.
80“China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights”, Report of the Panel, January 26, 2009,WT/DS362/R,
p.4.
81These cases include “United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998”, Report of the Panel, August 6, 2001, WT/DS176/R;
“United States—Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act”, Report of the Panel, June 15, 2000, WT/DS160/R; “China—Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights”, Report of the Panel, January 26, 2009, WT/DS362/R; and “European
Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs”, Report of the Panel, March 15,
2005, WT/DS174/R. Thomas Cottier and Marina Foltea, “Global Governance in Intellectual Property Protection: Does the Decision-making Forum
Matter?” (2012) 3 WIPO J. 139, 158.
82Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 1994 art.13.
83 “United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998”, Report of the Appellate Body, January 2, 2002, WT/DS176/AB/R, para.189.
84E.g. “Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages”, Report of the Appellate Body, October 7, 2006, WT/DS308/AB/R.
85WIPO, “Committee on Development and Intellectual Property”, available at http://www.wipo.int/policy/en/cdip/ [Accessed October 31, 2016].
86WIPO, “The 45 Adopted Recommendations under the WIPO Development Agenda”, available at http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda
/recommendations.html [Accessed October 31, 2016].
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calls on WTO members to “commit” at the highest political levels, to the letter and spirit of the Doha
Declaration and refrain from actions that limit the use of TRIPS flexibilities.87
Greater coordination among international organisations would streamline objectives to ensure that trade
and intellectual property objectives be not achieved at the cost of human lives and human rights. WIPO’s
commitment to the intellectual property and development agenda, the United Nations’ involvement in
this area, sets the right platform to create concrete steps in this area. At a general level, systems to incentivise
research should be streamlined to achieve a balance between innovation and access. As public funding
for research increases, the terms for private returns and incentives from publicly funded research deserves
closer scrutiny. For poorer nations, the term access should be defined to include investments into research
to treat diseases that disproportionately prevails in and affects poorer nations.
Conclusion
International organisations have an obligation to carefully act on behalf of all its members. Such an
obligation entails a careful consideration of local realities to generate co-operation to international efforts
at harmonisation. Neither international organisations nor individual member states can afford to be blind
to global effects from local crisis in other nations. The outbreak of Ebola in one part of the world, for
example, affected other parts of the world. Airlines, diversion of resources for screening and tourism are
just samples of industries that are immediately affected. Similarly, national economies affect global trade
when a loss of labour productivity ensues from a deteriorating public health, which, in turn, can affect
unrelated industries vital to international trade. Prioritising harmonisation at the cost of local economic,
political or social crisis is a misguided policy. So is allowing a powerful member to dominate and interfere
unduly with sovereign legitimate actions of other countries. Tools like compulsory licensing are critical
to restore national economies and to prevent a country’s deteriorations from affecting global trade. Global
responsibilities of developed nations should include an expectation to not unduly and unilaterally impose
itself on sovereign actions of other countries, especially to please local private actors.
87United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines, Report of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level
Panel on Access to Medicines Report: Promoting Innovation and Access to Health Technologies (2016).
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